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ABSTRACT

As information systems become an important competitive advantage for firms in the information age, how to attract and
retain IT professionals through compensation plans has been a critical issue in human resource management. This paper
presents the rationale of designing compensation for IT professionals based on the perspectives of agency theory and
contingency theory. With rapid change in IT professions and increasing complexity of IT work, firms face the challenges
of ineffective monitoring and outcome uncertainty. Under these constraints, incentive-based and competency-based
compensation are encouraged as they help create risk-sharing and reduce uncertainty for firms. In addition, they motivate
IT professionals to achieve firms’ strategic goals and encourage continuous learning.
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INTRODUCTION

With the advent of knowledge-intensive economies, organizations have become ever more reliant on the competence of
knowledge workers to create competitive advantage. Consequently, IT professionals as knowledge workers have become
increasingly significant. Compensation is identified as a critical lever in attracting and retaining IT professionals; therefore,
how to appropriately reward IT professionals has become a critical issue in the information age. Agency theory, presuming
that rewards should reflect individual behaviors, can be used to examine compensation schemes in organizations (Eisenhard,
1989). However, most agency theory research in this stream has focused on compensation contracts for middle or top
executives (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Westphal and Zajac 1994), while compensation programs for IT professionals are still
under-researched. To fill this gap, the purpose of this paper is to study the design of appropriate compensation for rewarding
IT professionals.
In addition to agency theory, the fit of contingency theory has been studied by compensation theorists as a crucial notion,
which assumes that effective reward systems should match internal and external factors specific to the organization so that
organizations enhance performance and attain goals (Boyd and Salamin, 2001; Salter, 1973). The fit between organizational
characteristics, types of industry, and compensation schemes for IT professionals is important in that appropriate
compensation plans can influence IT professionals’ behaviors and enhance competitive advantage for organizations.
Although considerable studies have examined the relationship between organizational strategy and reward systems, to date,
relatively few compensation studies have been focused on IT professionals (Ang, Slaughter and Ng, 2002). As such, the
second purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between organizational strategy and rewards for IT professionals at
macro-levels. Specifically, this paper examines the impacts of three contingency factors – stage in product life cycle, size of
organization, and trait of industry – on the design of compensation plans for IT professionals.
This paper first identifies the significance of IT professionals as knowledge workers in knowledge-intensive economies,
followed by a review of compensation literature. Available compensation plans and criteria/dimensions for determining
general compensation plans are summarized. Next, drawing on perspectives of agency theory and contingency theory,
propositions for designing compensation for IT professionals are developed. Implications to practice and research are
presented at the closing section.
IT Professional as Knowledge Workers in Knowledge-Intensive Economies

The rapid change in market environments has seen the gradual replacement of capital- and labor-intensive economies by
knowledge-intensive economies, where routine work has gradually been replaced by knowledge work (Starbuck, 1992). In
knowledge-intensive firms (e.g. IT, legal consulting and insurance), products or services often contain high information
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content; sophisticated information technologies are used to deliver these information-intensive products or services (Palmer
and Griffith 1998). In this regard, IT professionals as knowledge workers play an important role in knowledge-intensive
firms. In addition to organizations in the above industries, commentators have noted that, in practice, government and all
organizations across service and industrial are becoming more knowledge intensive (Drucker, 1988). All of these have shown
that IT professionals have become more and more critical in the information age. As such, an organization’s success in
attracting and retaining outstanding IT professionals will provide a competitive edge.
The nature of knowledge work involves the creation of new knowledge of organizations or markets, and the application of
this knowledge in valued technologies, products/services or processes (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). Hence, to complete
knowledge work requires competency in the professional area. Indeed competency of knowledge workers is a valued human
capital for organizations. Human capital theory suggests that differences in compensation should reflect differences in human
capital endowments among workers, such as education and experience (Becker, 1975; Mincer, 1970). Therefore,
competency of IT professionals is an important aspect to be considered when a compensation plan is designed.
Dougherty (1992) further contends that a critical feature of knowledge work is that it requires interdisciplinary expertise and
mutual learning of experts in different fields in order to achieve a complex synthesis of highly specialized state-of-the-art
technologies and knowledge domains. For example, IT planning and design in a financial consulting firm require integration
of differentiated pools of knowledge and expertise in information system, financial management, etc. Even in pure IT firms,
collaboration among IT professionals has been relied on to complete large projects. Indeed, group performance along with
competency of employees is the key to the success of organizations; therefore, effective compensation schemes should
motivate IT professionals to enhance learning, share knowledge and contribute to group performance.
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON COMPENSATION PLANS AND COMPENSATION CRITERIA

The two most prominent options of compensation plans in compensation research are fixed pay (base salary) and incentive
pay/variable pay (including commissions, bonuses, and profit sharing) (Stroh, Brett, Baumann and Reilly, 1996). Practically,
these two options are often combined with each other with the ratio contingent on different conditions. These two categories
are referred to as monetary compensation plans.
Alternatively, non-monetary compensation plans include career opportunities (e.g. promotion and training program),
adjustment of work content (e.g. assignment of responsibility and recognition), and affiliation (e.g. entitlement of
memberships) (Sethia and Von Glinow, 1985). In practice, these compensation plans are not mutual exclusively. Indeed a
mixed plan is a viable and feasible option. The first table in Appendix 1 provides a summary of these monetary and nonmonetary compensation plans. The information is primary based on the study of Basu, Srinivasan, and Staelin (1985) and the
work of Sethia and Von Glinow (1985).
In addition to compensation plans, Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1989) reviewed compensation literature and categorized
seventeen criteria/dimensions of determining compensation plans. The characteristics of these criteria are tabulated in table 2
in the Appendix. Competency-based (skill-based) criterion, which is pertinent to the attribute of knowledge work, is further
elaborated in the following section.
Competency-Based Compensation

Linking compensation with the concept of competency is a new development. A 1996 American Compensation Association
Survey reported that compensation is the least common and newest application of competency (Cira and Benjamin, 1998).
Competency including skill, education, learning and leadership, is a predictor of job performance. Organizations using
competency-based approaches to rewards are essentially valuing an employee’s ability to perform various activities critical to
the operation, rather than emphasizing a specific set of tasks associated with one job (Kanin-Lovers and Porter, 1991). The
advantages of competency-based reward systems include the encouragement of continuous learning, the improvement of
productivity, the delegation of decision-making, and the enhancement of quality (Sahraoui, 2002). The dimensions that the
above advantages highlight match the components of effective change in organizations, both in IT aspects and in people
aspects. It implies that competency-based rewards are an important mechanism to achieve effectiveness for organizations in
dynamic environments or in the process of implementing change.
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMPENSATIONS FOR IT PROFESSIONALS
Agency Theory Perspective

Agency theory has been an important perspective to studying compensation contracts. According to agency theory, there are
two prominent options for compensation contracts: behavior-based compensation contracts (i.e. base salary), and outcomebased compensation contracts (i.e. incentive pay). To better reflect the complexity of compensation planning in reality,
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested researchers consider agency contracts as a continuum rather than a dichotomy between
behavior-based and outcome-based contracts. She also suggested researchers incorporate a broader spectrum of contract
forms in that reward systems typically have multiple components. Several studies thereafter adopted mixed-pay between base
salary and incentive pay (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992; Roth and O’Donnell, 1996) or introduce new contract forms
such as beyond/average-market level pay plans (Roth and O’Donnell, 1996). Adopting Eisenhardt’s suggestions, this paper
views compensation contracts as a continuum between base salary and incentive pay. In addition, this paper incorporates
competency-based compensation and non-monetary compensation in discussing remuneration for IT professionals.
Agency theory assumes that principals purchase agent’s behaviors to complete the tasks. The agency problem arises because
of incongruence between the goals of the principal and the agent, and because of difficulty in monitoring or verifying agent’s
behavior (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). A principal can limit the agency problem by investing in information for monitoring
purposes or by contracting at least partially on the basis of the outcomes of the agent’s behaviors since agents are “utility
maximizers” (Eisenhard, 1988). However, in more complex situations, difficulty in monitoring or verifying agents’ behaviors
result from information asymmetries, such as when agents have more specialized knowledge than principals regarding task
performance (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1992), or lower task programmability, such as when the task requires specific
knowledge and therefore behaviors can not be easily defined and measured. If difficulty in monitoring exists, according to
Agency Theory, outcome-based compensation is suggested since it approaches goal-alignment between agent and principal
though risk sharing.
According to this perspective, information asymmetry may easily occur between principal and IT professionals because the
agent possesses specialized knowledge and skills that the principal lacks. Since investing in information to monitor IT
professionals’ behaviors is costly, emphasis on incentive pay is expected to account for a higher proportion in compensation
since incentive pay reduces outcome uncertainty.
P1. Given the occurrence of information asymmetry, incentive pay accounts for higher proportion in the total compensation
plan for IT professionals.
Also, task complexity and cooperation required for IT projects tends to lower task programmability and increase difficulty in
verifying individual performance. Tasks are even more difficult to be defined and measured during the process of IT
development or innovation, which is associated with high risk. Therefore, incentive pay is relied on during this process.
P2. Incentive pay for IT professionals is more effective in the process of IT development or innovation.
Similarly, incentive compensation plans for IT professionals are more effective for online businesses than for physical
businesses. This would apply not only because monitoring of behavior is more difficult and costly without physical presence,
but also because online businesses face greater uncertainty and thus higher risk in the marketplace. Risk sharing and goal
congruence facilitated by incentive compensation further motivates IT professionals to devote greater effort to achieve
success of the firm.
P3. Incentive pay for IT professionals is more effective for online businesses than for physical businesses.
The other factor influencing the extent of difficulty in monitoring is the expected length of the agent-principal relationship.
Agency theory assumes that in short-term relationships, collecting precise information about the agent’s behavior is more
difficult to achieve; therefore, outcome-based incentive pay should account for a higher proportion of compensation
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly, compensation for IT professionals undertaking outsourcing tasks should consist of a higher
proportion of incentive reward because principal-agent relationship in outsourcing is relatively short in time duration.
P4. Incentive pay accounts for higher proportion of the total compensation plan for outsourcing IT professionals.
The fact that IT jobs require specialized knowledge and skills has implications for competency-based compensation.
Competency in terms of education level and work experience serves as a predictor of agent’s performance and reduces
uncertainty related to adverse selection of agent in the recruiting stage. Therefore, the level of IT- related degree and length
of work experience are positively associated with the level of compensation; IT professionals with IT-related degrees tend to
receive higher compensation than those with IT certificates or those with non-IT degree. The benefits of recognition of
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competency include motivating IT professionals for continuous learning, which is highly required given rapid changes in
technology. Literature has shown that non-monetary rewards such as promotion opportunities and affiliation to organizations
are motivators to IT professionals (Reich and Kaarst-Brown, 1999). Hence promotion and affiliation are expected to increase
commitment of IT professionals and facilitate goal alignment between IT professionals and organizations.
P5. IT professionals with IT-related degree receive higher compensation than those with IT certificates or those with non-IT
degree.
Contingency Theory Perspective

Contingency theory has long been linked to research on executive compensation. The underlying assumption of the
contingency perspective is that effectiveness at realizing intended strategies depends significantly on the existence of a fit
among organizational strategy, organizational conditions and environment. As agency theory stresses the influence of microlevel factors on compensation schemes, contingency perspectives are concerned with the impact of macro-level factors.
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1987) pioneered studies in this stream. They identified that the effectiveness of reward systems
was contingent on characteristics of firms such as size, stage in the product life cycle, and traits of industry. Organizations at
the growth stage face great uncertainty and are more vulnerable. They face high rates of technological change and are
dependent on success of new product (or service) innovations to achieve stability in the marketplace (Hofer, 1975). The
expenditures in establishing technology, equipment, and R&D are high compared to firms in mature stage. Under this
uncertain environment, organizations are more likely to attract risk-taking technical personnel who are willing to trade off job
security and immediate rewards for the expected utility of anticipated growth (Ettlie, 1983). Therefore, firms in the growth
stage are expected to emphasize incentive pay. During the growth stage, incentive pay schemes function not only to motivate
individual and group performance, but also to finance future growth (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). The incentives are
paid to employees when the strategic objectives have been reached so that the firms can ensure more flexibility in investing
in R&D and technical innovation while paying later with a proportion of the profits (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990).
P6. Firms at growth stage place greater emphasize on incentive pay for IT professionals.
As firms enter into the mature stage, their status in the market is more stable and the environment is more predictable. Since
maintaining current market share and current IT systems are the primary objective, the need for change and anticipated
growth are reduced (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). Consequently, new products as a percentage of sales declines and
R&D expenses drop rapidly from growth to maturity (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984). Under this condition, incentive pay for
IT professionals is less attractive in the mature stage. Base salary and job security are expected to account for a higher
proportion of compensation in this stage (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1990). All in all, incentive pay is more attractive for
firms in the growth stage than firms in mature stage, while base salary is less appealing for firms in the growth stage than
firms in the mature stage.
P7. Firms in mature stage will emphasize base salary and job security for IT professionals.
Following this line of logic, physical firms tend to pay higher base salary compared to their virtual counterparts because their
business model is known, and supply chain and customer relationships are established. Base salary in this case signals risk
aversion. The current trend has seen that physical firms are moving into the domain of e-commerce (click and mortar). This
diversified strategy of doing business both online and offline typically reduces risk. Therefore, IT professionals working in
online business division of physical firms are expected to receive a higher proportion of their total compensation as “base
pay” than IT professionals in pure online companies.
P8. IT professionals working in online business division of physical firms receive higher proportion of base pay in their total
compensation plan than those in pure online companies receive.
According to these arguments, IT professionals working for dot.com are expected to be remunerated less in the form of base
salary as online commerce is still at the developing stage. Online companies whose business model and customer
relationships are still in the developing stage face greater fluctuation and higher uncertainty than their physical counterparts.
IT professionals receiving incentive compensation are treated as risk takers and are motivated to devote their efforts to
achieving strategic goals of companies. Currently, online businesses suffer from dynamic turbulence. Many dot.coms not
only lost money but went out of business. This is another reason that base salary is expected to account for a smaller
proportion of compensation since emphasizing incentive compensation scheme help dot.coms defer the burden of IT
personnel expenditures and provide increased flexibility to pay off immediately debts.
P9. IT professionals in dot.coms receive higher proportion of incentive pay than base salary.
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The above arguments also imply that during the IT development stage firms are inclined to reward IT professionals with
lower base pay. With remuneration based on incentive pay in the IT growth stage, IT professionals are treated as co-risktakers, and firms benefit from the flexibility to allocate financial resources into technical development. Firms’ IT strategies
can further influence the compensation for IT professionals. Firms with a strategy of adopting cutting edge IT tend to
remunerate with higher percentages of incentive pay than firms following a strategy of expanding on existing technology.
Again, this may be due to the fact that expenditures on technical innovation are more expensive and are associated with
higher uncertainty and risk. Conversely, expenditures for expanding an existing IT platform are relatively low. Because firms
have more knowledge and experience of the existing systems, uncertainty and risk are reduced.
P10. Firms in IT development stage rely on higher proportion of incentive pay to IT professionals than base salary.
P11. Firms acquiring new IT systems emphasize incentive pay to IT professionals more than firms expanding on existing IT
infrastructure and systems.
The other contingency factor influencing compensation schemes is the size of the firm. Smaller organizations with limited
budgets are less able to afford fixed personnel expenditures so that they are inclined to pay lower base salary in exchange of
securing short-term financial stability (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). This approach permits smaller companies to
compete while reducing cash outlays (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). Larger firms tend to establish performance evaluation
systems that emphasize consistency, centralization, and standardization; hence, positions are remunerated based on a fixed
scale (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). Accordingly, incentive pay for IT professionals in smaller firms is expected to
account for greater proportion of the total reward package, and based pay for IT professional is likely to be preferable and
more effective in larger firms. In addition, IT professionals in larger firms are expected to receive less diversified
compensation plans since large firms tend to establish centralized and standardize pay scales. Alternatively, IT professionals
in small firms usually have greater bargaining power. Differences in compensation among individual IT professionals are
expected to be more common, as it is less likely to be regulated by salary policy.
P12. IT professionals in smaller firms will receive a higher proportion of incentive pay in the compensation plan.
P13. Difference in compensation among individual IT professional is more common in smaller firms than that in larger firms.
In addition to organizational factors of market strategy and size, industrial trait is an important contingency variable as well.
Researchers have shown that incentive pay as a proportion of total compensation is higher in high-tech firms and the use of
incentive pay is more effective in technical industries (Galbraith and Merrill, 1991). This is attributed to the concept that
incentive pay compensates the high risk assumed by employees (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). Accordingly, the
proportion of incentive pay in the total compensation for IT professionals is expected to be higher in high-tech-oriented firms
than for IT professionals in traditional, not-technical-oriented firms.
P14. IT professionals in high-tech-oriented firms will receive a higher proportion of incentive pay in the total compensation
than those in non-high-tech-oriented firms receive.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE COMPENSATION POLICY MAKERS

Both agency theory and contingency theory predict that incentive compensation plays a more important role in attracting and
retaining IT professionals. This may be because IT professionals are within a highly competitive and rapidly changing
technical environment. While new hardware, software, and telecommunications products emerge at an exponential rate, risk
and outcome uncertainty are enhanced. In addition, the task complexity of managing IT systems encourages the use of
specific incentive pay where performance indicators are not available.
Rapidly change in the IT field presents growth opportunities, but at the same time challenges IT management, which require
specialized knowledge, experience and skills. To improve effectiveness of IT management, combining competency-based
pay with incentive pay is an effective option. As mentioned before, the advantages of a well-designed competency-based pay
system include encouraging continuous learning, improving productivity, delegating decision-making, and enhancing quality.
These dimensions have been identified as components of effectiveness of IT planning and management (Sahraoui, 2002) and
increase the likelihood of alignment of IT with business strategy.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Stream of Agency Theory

According to the perspective of agency theory, rewards should reflect individual’s performance. If a company can accurately
measure individual performance and align rewards accordingly, the reward system would serves as a reinforcement of desired
behaviors. However, individual behavior of IT personnel is hard to monitor and measure. Given that competency is an
important predictor of IT professional’s performance, future IT compensation research in this stream is suggested to include
competency such as education level and work experience as criteria for determining compensation contracts.
In addition, future research in this stream is encouraged to incorporate desirability and availability of non-monetary and
intangible reward into the options of compensation plans. The influence of promotion opportunities and affiliation on IT
professionals’ performance needs further clarification as well.
Stream of Contingency theory

This study discusses the main effects of contingency factors on the choice of compensation plans for IT professionals.
However, the interaction affects between contingency factors is likely to exist. For example, the proportion of incentive pay
in IT professionals’ compensation plans is expected to be higher in smaller firms than in larger firms. This may not be the
case, however, if the smaller firm is in a traditional industry and the larger firm is in a volatile high-tech industry. This
example illustrates that industry trait may affect the relationship between organizational size and choice of compensation
schemes, as illustrated in Figure 1. Therefore, in addition to testing the main affects of each contingency factor, empirical
studies are encouraged to test interaction affects cross various contingency factors.
Future research on compensation for IT professionals is also encouraged to incorporate multiple theories to gain a more
comprehensive insight. Organizational studies tend to evaluate compensation schemes from the perspective of organizations,
whereas many compensation theories focus on individuals. Future studies are also suggested to examine reward systems from
the viewpoint of IT professionals and examine if IT professionals and top-managers perceive the reward systems differently.
The impact of compensation for IT professionals on organizations’ IT strategy, outcome of R&D, and IT development are
other domains in need of research attention if alignment of IT compensation is to help support strategic alignment of IT and
business.

Compensation
Schemes

Size of Firms

Industry Traits

Figure 1: Example of interaction effect among contingency factors.
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APPENDIX

Relevant Situations

Advantages

Disadvantages

Characteristics

Base Salary /Fixed Pay

When teamwork is
involved and individual’s
effort is difficult to
measure; When the
management wishes to
achieve long-term
objective; appealing to
security oriented people

Rather easy to
administer;

Inability to provide a
strong motivation for
excelling and to induce
high performance;
discourage innovation

Behaviorbased/competence
based

Commissions/Incentive
Pay/ Variable Pay

When short-term growth
is preferred; When agents
has good control of
external environment,
Appealing to achievement
oriented people; appealing
to risk-takers

Relative fair for
rewarding
individual
achievement;
encourage
motivation and
productivity.

Ineffectiveness in
engaging in activities not
directly linked to
commissions; discourage
internal cooperation;
result in a perception of
unstable earnings and job
insecurity and thus a
difficulty in retention
during bad times.

Outcome-based

Career

When long-term
performance and effort is
desired, promotion
opportunities can be an
incentive performance

Ensure job
security

Work Content

Affiliation

Motivate achievementoriented employees

Training and
development
program/
promotion
opportunity
Could be a challenge to
agent

Establish long-term
employment

Intrinsic reward;
responsibility;
recognition;
promotion
Membership

Table 1: Summary of Available Compensation Plans.
Sources of Information: Basu, Srinivasan, and Staelin (1985) and the
work of Sethia and Von Glinow (1985)
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Characteristics

Characteristics

Job vs. Skill (competency)

Job-based pay: used when job value can be
determined; commonly used in traditional
settings

Skill base pay: used when jobs are fluid,
employee exchange is frequent and so on; often
combined with job-based pay

Performance vs. Seniority

Performance-based pay: used when
performance can be measured

Seniority-base pay: If performance can be
measured, this can be an alternative

Individual vs. Group
Performance

Individual-base pay: used if individual
contribution can be measured

Group-based pay: used when cooperation is
needed; when there is a lack of individual
output indicators

Short vs. Long-Term
Orientation

Short-term Orientation: short-term
performance is easily measured;
information for measurement is easily
obtained; used when maintaining current
market share is the business strategy

Long-term orientation: performances is not
easy to measure; information for measurement
is not easy to obtain; used when firms
experience growth, acquiring new business and
taking financial risks

Risk Aversion vs. Risk Taking

Risk-aversion pay: used in mature stage

Risk-taking pay: used in growth stage

Corporate vs. Division
Performance

Corporate-performance-based pay: used
when market is stable and corporate is
vertically integrated

Division-performance-based pay: used in startup phase or growing through acquisitions

Beyond market level vs.
average/ below market level

Beyond market level pay: attracting and
retaining high qualified employees

Average/below market level pay: for low skill
jobs

Internal vs. External Equity

Internal equity: dependent division

External equity: autonomous division

Qualitative vs. Quantitative

Qualitative measure of performance:
suitable for vertically integrated companies;
suitable for long-term goals; used in new
product development

Quantitative measure of performance: suitable
for short-term goals; suitable for firms growing
through mergers and acquisitions

Fixed Pay vs. Incentives

Fixed pay: lower risk; associated with
strategy of maintaining market share

Incentives pay: higher risk; associated with
strategy of extending market share

Frequency of Raises or
Bonuses

Frequent bonus and merit pay: associated
with short-term performance

Deferred compensation: associated with longterm performance

Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic

Intrinsic rewards: suitable for achievementoriented employees; suitable for firms that
seldom make adjustments

Work better if it combines with intrinsic
rewards

Centralization vs.
Decentralization of Pay
Policies

Centralized pay policy: used when economy
of scale is realized; when expertise from
headquarters is necessary; when internal
equity is emphasized

Decentralized pay policy: used when local
innovation is beneficial; when business units
are in different markets or at different stages in
product life cycle

Open vs. Secret Pay

Open pay policy: encourages
communication and involvement

Secret pay policy: lead to low trust

Participation vs.
Low/Nonparticipation of
employees

Participation of employees: related to
nontraditional compensation systems and
highly knowledgeable workers

Low/ nonparticipation: fits the traditional,
bureaucratic compensation approach

Bureaucratic vs. Flexible
Policies

Bureaucratic pay policy: formalized and
centralized

Flexible pay policy: allow for modifications
when necessary

Table 2: Criteria for Determining Compensation Scheme (Source of information: Gomez-Mejia and Welbourne (1989)
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